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rejected. Part IV consists of a summary concluding that if Americans do not have a constitutional right to refuse to purchase an individual health insurance policy, then they do not have a legally enforceable right to refuse specific medical treatments.
II. RATIONALES FOR THE INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MANDATE
The most important legal challenges to the individual health insurance mandate provision of the PPACA are motivated by the challengers' concern about an infringement of Americans' liberty interests, a concern that has been disparaged by a number of PPACA supporters. 12 The challengers' chief argument in the courts, however, has taken the form of a claim that Congress exceeded its express constitutional authority in enacting the individual mandate. 13 More particularly, challengers submit that Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce 14 extends (albeit extremely broadly) 15 only to provisions regarding actions by regulated persons or entities involving goods and services that are traded interstate, and that an individual's unwillingness to purchase health insurance represents a form of inactivity over which Congress has no lawful control. 16 Thus, Congress's "claimed power [in enacting the PPACA under a Commerce Clause rationale] is tantamount to a national police power inasmuch as it lacks principled limits." 17 Critics of the PPACA contend further that the individual mandate provision cannot be justified alternatively on the basis of any other constitutionally enumerated congressional power, including the power to tax to raise revenues for the general welfare.
18 12 See, e.g., Arthur J.R. Baker 
, Fundamental Mismatch: The Improper Integration of Individual Liberty Rights into Commerce Clause Analysis of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 259, 296 (2011) ("There is a history of efforts to show that congressional legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause violates some implicit-and typically poorly articulatedliberty right. The Court has rejected these claims in the past and should do so here with respect to the individual mandate." (citations omitted)). 13 See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2247 (2011) (" [M] ost scholars and lawyers have focused on structural questions, particularly whether Congress has authority to require individual insurance coverage under either its power to tax or its power to regulate interstate commerce. Indeed, even those scholars who argue that the mandate is unconstitutional because it infringes individual liberty do not rely on substantive due process-much less on a freedom of health-to support their claims." (citations omitted)). Baker objects to this legal strategy, contending that it is "important to address the question [of substantive due process] forthrightlyrather than smuggle it into the analysis under the guise of the Commerce Clause . . . ." Baker, supra note 12, at 310. 14 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. Defenders of the PPACA reject the activity/inactivity dichotomy, at least in the healthcare context, as it might purportedly apply to Commerce Clause analysis. Their position, put succinctly, is as follows:
With rare exception, at some point every individual will require health care services. Therefore, the decision of many individuals not to purchase coverage-whether consciously or not-presents a free rider problem. These individuals will generally receive care, whether or not they are able to pay toward that care. For those individuals for whom health coverage is unaffordable, there is a societal obligation to create remedies. On the other hand, for those individuals who could afford to purchase coverage, yet choose not to, it should be clear that "free riding" cannot be sanctioned. 19 Thus, according to this view, by exposing society to the risk of bearing the financial costs of one's illness or injury because one has failed to purchase health insurance, that person's failure to purchase coverage impacts the goods and services traded in interstate commerce. A number of leading public health law commentators defend the validity of the PPACA as a legitimate exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority by essentially reframing the question, moving beyond a narrowly focused concern about precisely demarcating the blurred line between action and inaction. The public health rationale for the PPACA as constitutionally proper is exemplified by the statement:
In cultural terms, the Court will have to decide whether PPACA is about preserving a fiscally and otherwise healthy collectivity-the nation-or about preserving an individually defined bundle of rights. Perhaps subconsciously, the Justices must frame the relationship between government and individual access to the health care system as primarily either about collective governance or about fostering individual self-governance. Fundamentally, the legitimacy of the individual mandate turns on whether the Court will accept that a sacrifice of individual economic liberty is justified by an obligation to contribute to the common good that accompanies membership in the American political community. 20 According to this view, the PPACA must be understood as represent[ing] a determination that a major national problem-access to health care-requires a national solution, and that the solution can work only under conditions in which everyone has health insurance. It further represents a determination that achieving this aim through the market, rather than through a direct government provision of health care, is the best approach. 23 In sum, the argument is that, when it comes to Commerce Clause application, "health care is different" 24 and legislation intended to produce social or collective benefits is entitled to special respect. 25 
III. EXTENDING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MANDATE RATIONALE TO THE MEDICAL TREATMENT CONTEXT
The Supreme Court has been asked to hold that "population-based arguments can be used to justify PPACA's [individual insurance] mandate" and that the "PPACA's mandate . . . can be justified by considering the economic consequences of the inaction that is prohibited" because "in terms of the constitutional analysis, the decisions of individuals to forego entry into the insurance market, when aggregated, place a substantial burden on the interstate health care market."
26 If the Court responds to this argument sympathetically, the same public health logichealthcare is different-ought to apply a fortiori to legitimize future federal laws that would mandate individuals to undergo particular medical treatments, with only narrow exceptions for religious objections 27 or proof of medical contraindications 28 for the specific individual. There are many instances in which patients' assertions of their right to refuse medical intervention, when aggregated, eventually result in unnecessary expenditures and place a substantial burden on the interstate healthcare market in a way that threatens the government's aim to maximize the public's access 29 If the courts are willing to soften their ordinary Commerce Clause scrutiny in reviewing enactments by a well-meaning Congress because the resulting legal scheme is aimed at the paramount goal of improving the public's health, 30 certainly federal laws targeted at fostering the public's health by compelling individuals to undergo specific forms of medical interventions are entitled to the same judicial deference.
31 "The Government concedes the novelty of the mandate and the lack of any doctrinal limiting principles; indeed, at oral argument defending the PPACA, the Government could not identify any mandate to purchase a product or service in interstate commerce that would be unconstitutional, at least under the Commerce Clause." 32 The American populace, acting through Congress, would no longer be restrained from compelling individuals, whose selfish medical choices harmed the collective good by driving up healthcare costs, to do their civic duty to undergo cost-effective interventions.
33 Society would be empowered to "explore methods to reshape existing therapeutic relationships-and the law and financial arrangements that shape those relationships-to achieve greater sensitivity to values beyond those of the immediate patient . 38 health problems for which legal compulsion has the potential (quite literally) to pay dividends for American society.
One example concerns influenza, an acute illness that, when contracted, can lead to substantial healthcare costs and lost economic productivity. 39 The naturally occurring public health problem of seasonal flu, which leads "to about 200,000 hospitalizations and several thousand deaths in the United States" each year, may be a more realistically significant national threat than potential bioterrorism incidents. 40 Influenza vaccination rates among adults remain well below desired levels, largely because of public ignorance, misunderstanding, and perceptions of inconvenience, 41 despite studies that have quantified clearly the economic value of such vaccination from the societal and payer perspectives. 42 Recognition of the social value of making influenza vaccination more widespread has been reflected in, for example, a proposed rule to add a Medicare/Medicaid condition of participation requiring hospitals, rural health clinics, federally qualified health centers, and end-stage renal disease facilities to offer influenza vaccinations to almost all of their inpatients and outpatients. 43 Laws in at least one state 44 require certain healthcare workers to undergo vaccination for influenza.
Large-scale, voluntary adult influenza vaccination programs in the United States historically have delivered disappointing results. 45 Given the incontrovertible evidence of its potential benefits to interstate commerce due to expected reduced healthcare costs and lessened loss of work productivity, a national program of mandatory influenza vaccination would be consistent with the same public health values undergirding the PPACA's individual health insurance mandate and hence would be a valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority under any Supreme Court decision upholding the insurance mandate provision.
A second example of compelled treatment that has the potential to contribute positively to interstate commerce by containing healthcare costs and reducing lost economic productivity concerns interventions (which could take a variety of pharmacologic 46 and non-pharmacologic forms) 47 for chronic depression. 48 The economic burden of depression in the United States, measured in terms of treatment costs, mortality costs arising from depression-related suicides, and costs associated with depression in the workplace, is enormous. 49 Although much research is yet to be done to improve therapeutic intervention success rates in the depression area, 50 a significant number of patients are able to be restored to a higher level of functional capacity as a result of clinical treatment. 51 Compelled medical treatment for chronically depressed individuals presumably would somewhat increase total direct treatment expenditures, but also would likely substantially reduce mortality costs arising from depression-related suicides and costs associated with depression in the workplace. Those reduced economic costs would impact interstate commerce favorably, and thus constitute a justification for congressional action that is part of a broad scheme intended to improve the nation's health.
A third area ripe for substantial health costs savings that would benefit American society as a whole, and therefore that would be consistent with an ultrabroadly defined goal of the Commerce Clause, relates to treatments intended to reduce the risk of cardiovascular disease. The morbidity and premature mortality associated with cardiovascular disease exert a substantial negative national economic effect, thus burdening interstate commerce. 52 The multiplied risk factor connection between hypertension and elevated lipid levels and the development of cardiovascular disease has been amply documented, 53 as has the cost-effectiveness
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of preventive pharmacological treatment of persons identified as at high risk because of their blood pressure and cholesterol profiles. 54 Yet, voluntary patient adherence to prescribed medication regimes for these cardiovascular disease risk factors is alarmingly low, 55 a problem that a legal mandate might remedy effectively. The federal government has a legitimate, arguably even compelling, economic interest in reducing the incidence of cardiovascular disease in the population. 56 The same public health-focused Commerce Clause interpretation that would sustain congressional enactment of the individual health insurance mandate provision in the PPACA surely could serve to undergird a federal requirement that individuals positively contribute to the nation's commerce by adhering to medication instructions designed to reduce the population's risk of developing expensive cardiovascular-disease-related morbidity and premature mortality.
B. RESPONSES TO OBJECTIONS TO FEDERAL MEDICAL TREATMENT MANDATES
Objections to federal statutory or regulatory mandates that individuals undergo particular medical treatments, enacted on the predicate that compelled treatment will benefit the public health, are likely to fail for several interrelated reasons. These reasons pertain to the weakness of the individual rights at stake and the strength of the public interest justifying the mandates in question.
First, despite some intimations to the contrary based on considerations of bodily integrity, 57 there does not exist unequivocal, contemporary recognition of a fundamental individual right to refuse medical treatment 58 (at least in a non-research context). 59 "[L]iberties regularly shift in or out of 'fundamental' status in response to changing social norms," 60 and might be afforded less importance when weighed against the societal commitment to contain healthcare costs so as to enhance society's capacity to assure access to healthcare more universally. "[T]he presumption of individual liberty is a conditional claim that one can rebut. . . . Individuals are not, therefore, meaningfully sovereign-unless that term means only that individuals are subject to legal regulation only when they are in fact subject to legal regulation." 61 Certainly, federal mandates that intrude on bodily integrity in non-medical situations, such as the requirement that unwilling individuals submit to military service on behalf of the collective good, have consistently been upheld as valid. 62 Second, the few decisions in which legal mandates of medical treatment have been invalidated have involved individual liberty or privacy interest challenges to the exercise of a state's police power to promote the general health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community. 63 Never has a court invalidated (nor, for that matter, been asked to invalidate) a medical treatment mandate enacted by Congress under its Commerce Clause authority, nor is a court likely to invalidate such a national law in the face of clear Supreme Court precedent upholding the individual insurance mandate of the PPACA. Indeed, deference to congressional Commerce Clause authority fits nicely with the widely shared position that "[h]ealthcare regulation in the modern age should be a national project entrusted solely to the central government." 64 Moreover, protestations that a judicial ruling upholding the PPACA on Commerce Clause grounds would not open the door for Congress to require individuals to buy and eat broccoli 65 are wrong. Fair-minded advocates of the As one set of public health law experts reminds us, [t] he Supreme Court has expressly recognized the governmental interest in protecting the public health, safety, and environment from known or imminent harms under the Commerce Clause. . . . The Supreme Court has consistently upheld federal statutory provisions intended primarily to protect the public's health so long as there was a commerce "hook," principally that the object of regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 71 For more than a century, the courts have held that a "sacrifice of liberty could be demanded of the individual by the state in the interest of furthering the social compact, specifically in the context of health." 72 Public health law scholars defending the PPACA even go so far as to warn that judicial invalidation of the PPACA's individual insurance mandate would fatally imperil the federal government's ability to control beneficially individual behavior in future public health emergencies, and they predict a "chilling . . . loss of life that might result from the constitutional precedent that a negative [PP]ACA ruling would set." 73 Individual medical treatment refusals, just like decisions to decline the purchase of health insurance, have direct and significant economic and health-related costs for the entire population. 74 The federal government may, consistent with public health law precedent and a PPACA individual insurance mandate predicated on an expansive reading of Congress's Commerce Clause authority, compel an individual to undertake an affirmative action [e.g., submit to medical treatment] to promote the greater good. . . . Laws ordering individuals to engage in actions to promote public health-i.e., public health mandates-certainly have their place in our public health law armamentarium. By responding to complex collective [action] problems to which less coercive legal measures may fall short, mandates can help to alter norms and the social environment in ways that promote health. 75 
IV. CONCLUSION
As PPACA defenders remind us, "mandates are a common public health law tool." 76 According to those defenders, the PPACA's individual insurance mandate is simply a logical continuation of that tradition. The PPACA itself, despite its physical girth, still left in its wake many details to be worked out over time through IF WE CAN FORCE PEOPLE TO PURCHASE HEALTH INSURANCE, THEN LET'S FORCE THEM TO BE TREATED TOO 409 subsequent regulatory and enforcement processes. 77 Similarly, a program of congressional mandates requiring that individual Americans submit to particular forms of medical intervention because, on the whole, such a forced treatment program would be beneficial to the public health and therefore to the nation's commerce, would necessitate the working out of numerous substantive and procedural details. But let us put aside the admittedly myriad possible policy and political considerations 78 that certainly would be entailed in designing and implementing a comprehensive public health program centered on various forms of compelled medical treatment. 79 The point of this Article is that there would be no constitutional impediments to Congress to rely upon the tradition of mandates as a public health tool in a post-PPACA-approved world. Such an approach would be fueled by an expansive, public health-oriented interpretation of the Commerce Clause that gives the green light to policymakers to promote the population's good by requiring individuals to submit to specific medical treatments when there are valuable resources to be conserved-and hence commerce and the social compact to be promoted-by so doing. The reading of the Commerce Clause argued for by proponents of the PPACA would set in motion an unstoppable slippery slope, but so what? After all, healthcare is "different."
77 CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 7-5700, REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PUBLIC LAW 11-148) 2 (2010) (identifying more than forty provisions in the legislation "that require, permit, or contemplate rulemaking by federal agencies to implement the [Act]"). 78 For example, how would we handle the increased professional manpower needs implicated by recognition of a patient's duty to accept medical treatments that, at present, could be declined under the doctrine of informed consent? See Marshall B. Kapp, Conscripted Physician Services and the Public's Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 414 (2011). Would individual physicians be able to assert a right of conscience to refuse to participate in forced medical treatment of patients even if such treatment were congressionally authorized?
79 Some commentators try to assure us that the courts need not worry about the compelled broccoli-eating argument asserted in some challenges to the PPACA's individual health insurance purchase mandate, because political opposition would scuttle any silly bill compelling conduct like broccoli eating. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 3, at 1869-70. Hall's unqualified faith in "rational deliberation and democratic electoral constraints," id. at 1870, as effective protections against Congress enacting broccoli-eating-like laws is unjustified, particularly as pressure mounts on politicians to constrain national healthcare expenditures. Similar reliance "on our democratic political process to protect us from unreasonable statutes," Orentlicher, Can Congress Make You Buy Broccoli?, supra note 66, at 14, seems excessively optimistic. See, e.g., Jonathan Oberlander, Health Care Policy in an Age of Austerity, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1075 (2011) ("The rise of austerity politics has important implications for health policy. The pervasive belief in Washington that deficit reduction is an economic imperative alters normal political rules. In a crisis environment, policymakers are more likely than usual to take on powerful interest groups and contemplate controversial reforms."). Other attempts to blithely assume away, rather than confront, the possibility of federal laws coercing individual health-promoting behaviors are equally unpersuasive. See, e.g., Huhn, supra note 3, at 157 ("The constitutionality of such invasive and apparently arbitrary laws can be dealt with when and if our legislatures ever deign to enact them."); Elhauge, supra note 57 (" [O] ur Constitution has no provision banning stupid laws."). Evading analysis of the constitutional issues through wishful thinking likely would earn poor grades from any of these commentators if engaged in by one of their law students on a final examination.
